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Carter,

'l'raynor, J., Spence,

for a rehearing was deHied May 8,
C. ,J ., and 'l'raynoe, .J., W\:re of the opinion
should be granted.

A.

~o.

24262.

In Bank.

Apr. 12, 1957.]

Estate of ,JOSEPH C. POlSIJ, Deeease(l. 'l'HOMAS W.
HUUHES, Appellant, v. IWBEH'l' L. l<'EIWUSON, as
Executor, etc., et al., llespoudents.
[1] Appeal-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of
Benefits.-Generally, the voluntary acceptance of the henefit
of a judgment or order is a bar to the prosecution of an
appeal, since the right to accept the fruits of the judgment
and the right to appeal therefrom are wholly inconsistent, and
an election to takP one is a renunciation of the other.
[2] !d.-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of Benefits.-An exception to the rule that a party may not accept the
fruits of a judgment and at the same time appeal therefrom is
recognized where he is concededly entitled to the benefits that
are accepted and a reversal will not affect the right to those
benefits.
[3] Id.- Loss or Waiver of Right of Review- Acceptance of
Benefit,s.-\Vhere there was an agreement by an executor that
his attorney's receipt of a fee awarded by the court for extraordinary preliminary services would not bar the attorney's
appeal from the "judgment," where before anything was paid
the attorney advised the executor that he intended to appeal
and that his acceptance of the amount awarded would not
affect his appeal because he was claiming more, and where

[1] Right of appeal from judgment or decree as affected by
acceptance of benefit thereunder, note, 169 A.L.R. 985. See also
Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 134; Am.Jur., Appeal and Error,
§ 214 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 107; [2, 3, 5, 6]
Appeal and Error,§ 110; [41 Decedents' Estates, § 151.
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the executor was
advised to the
made partial
on the award :md it was
him, effect should be
tlwre
he no estoppel or waiver of the
because of
such payment and

[4] Decedents' Estates-Executor-Powers and Duties.-An executor is the duly authorized
of the estate, and
11s such he is in
of the funds of the estate
to
the court's orders for
of c>xpPnsPs of administration,
claims against the estate and distribution to beneficiaries of the
rstate.
[51 Appeal-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of
Benefits. - 'fo bar the right of appC'al on the ground of
aequiescPncc in the jud;onPnt, the arts relied on must be such
as clearly and unmistakably show
and acquicscPnce must be unconditional, voluntary and absolute.
[6] !d.-Loss or Waiver of Right of Review-Acceptance of Benefits.- An agreement that acceptancP of the benefits of a ;judgment shall not bar the right of appPal will h(~
and
it preservPs thnt right.

MO'I.'ION to dismisR an appeal from a jndgnw11t of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Vietor R. Hansen,
,T udge. Motion denied.
Thomas \V. Hughes, m pro. per., and Alfred h Bartlett
for Appellant.
Ben lVI. Koelnmm for Hespondent Bmmn PoisL
CARTER, ,T.~Tn this ease, Hughes, the attorney for the
executor under dec·edent'f> \Yill in the above mentioned estate,
petitioned the snperior c·onrt administering
law in
the estate JH'IH'eedings, to have it ot·clered that he be paid
attorney's fees for extraordinary seryires performed in opposing the proerecling· in the lower court and on appenl by rlecedent's widow to revoke the will of clec~edcnt as to her on the
ground that she was not providP<l fOl' as recrnire11
section
70 of the Probate Code, the will having been made lwfore
her maniage Io clct·t'<1t·llL
ObjPt'l ion:.; ~wvt·e :filed to the petition and, after· l1<·uring ihPreon, iht· t'Otll't fuo]](1 tlwt in tlw
prtWt'<'di111~·s for l'<'\'<H-Iltion qj' llle 11ill tltt' wir1ow di<1 not
•·liilllt•llg•' tli" \alidity of the \rill but
that it
*Tltc widow was Jmsuecespful in the lower court whosp ordPr was

nffirmed by the Distrirt Comt of
(Estate of Poisl, 44 Cal.2d 147 [280

but reversPd hY this eourt
7891).
·
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was revoked under section 70 which was the same as a petition
to determine heirship under section 1080 of the Probate Code;
that Hughes performed all the above mentioned services, but
the preliminary services of bringing the parties (the legatees
under the >Yill and the widow) before the court in the revocation proceedings was his only legal duty and such services
were worth $1,000; that he had no duty to participate in the
trial or appellate work in the revocation proceedings, and
therefore fees for such services were not proper. Accordingly
the court rendered its "judgment" that Hughes was "entitled'' to a $1,000 fee for the extraordinary preliminary services. He appeals, asserting that he was entitled to compensation for the services performed on trial and appeal as well.
Defendant widow now moves to dismiss the appeal by reason
of the acceptance by Hughes of the $1,000. On October 3,
1955, after the court indicated what its order would be,
Hughes wrote to the executor that he intended to appeal but
that the only ground of appeal would be that more fees
should have been allowed him and that the $1,000 to be
awarded would not be affected, quoting from Clarke v. Angelus
Memorial Assn., 14 Oal.App.2d 750 [58 P.2d 974], to the
effect that where the question on appeal is whether the
recovery should be greater than that allowed by the lower
court, the acceptance of the amount adjudged due did not bar
the appeal. After the order for $1,000 attorney's fees above
mentioned was made (but prior to its entry), $300 thereof was
paid to Hughes by the executor on October 19, 1955, and the
balance of $700 was paid on October 28, 1955. On receipt of
the check for $300 by Hughes on October 24, 1955, he again
wrote to the executor stating that it was accepted "without
prejudice" to his "contemplated appeal from the order"
allowing $1,000 because he sought a larger sum which was in
accord with the case theretofore cited in the former (October
3, 1955) letter. At the time the balance of $700 was paid on
October 28, 1955, he again advised the executor that it was
accepted only on the condition specified in his former letters,
he was not waiving his right to appeal, and would not sign
or enter a satisfaction of judgment; this was ''agreed'' to
by the executor, and no satisfaction of the $1,000 allowance
has been made or entered.
The widow asserts that there was a voluntary acceptance of
the fruits of the judgment ($1,000) barring the right to appeal. Hughes claims there was an agreement that the acceptance of the $1,000 should not be considered as barring the
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appeal and that in any event the judgment for $1,000, which
was accepted, was severable from the claim for fees for the
litigation itself, to which he was entitled in any case, and
was not placed in jeopardy by the appeal; moreover the
widow did not appeal from the $1,000 award.
[1] The latest statement by this court on the subject is
as follows: "It is the general rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a judgment or order is a bar to the
prosecution of an appeal, since the right to accept the fruits
of the judgment and the right to appeal therefrom are wholly
inconsistent, and an election to take one is a renunciation of the
other. [Citations.] [2] An exception to the general rule
exists where the appellant is concededly entitled to the benefits which are accepted and a reversal will not affect the
right to those benefits. [Citations.]" (Mathys v. Tttrner,
46 Cal.2d 364, 365 [294 P.2d 947].)
[3] But here, from Hughes' undisputed affidavit, we have
an agreement by the executor that the receipt of payment of
the $1,000 award would not bar the appeal. Before anything
was paid on the judgment Hughes advised the executor that he
intended to appeal and that the payment and acceptance of
the $1,000 would not affect his appeal because he was claiming
more. Thereafter the executor paid $300 and was again
advised to the same effect. The same occurred on the payment
and acceptance of the $700 balance and it was agreed to by
the executor. There would appear to be no reason why effect
should not be given to that agreement. There should be no
estoppel or waiver of the right to appeal because of it. No
point is made of whether the executor rather than the widow
could make such an agreement but it would appear that he
had the right to do so inasmuch as the matter involved was
the payment of money for claimed attorney's fees from the
assets of the estate. [4] There is no question that the
executor was the duly authorized representative of the estate.
As such he was in charge of the funds of the estate subject
to the court's orders for payment of expenses of administration, claims against the estate and distribution to the beneficiaries of the estate.
While it has been held that a taking of possession after
judgment in an eminent domain proceeding with the taker's
reservation of the right to appeal does not, under the statutes
there involved, preserve the right to appeal (lift. Shasta Power
Corp. v. Dennis, 66 Cal.App. 186 [225 P. 877]) we find no case
in this state holding that an agreement that an appeal shall
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not be barred by acceptance of the benefits of the judgment
(as distinguished from a unilateral reservation by the appellant), will not preserve the right to appeal. [5] In regard
to acceptance of the benefits of the judgment as barring the
acceptor's appeal, it is said in Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal.2d 202,
214 [259 P.2d 656]: "However,' (i)11 order to bar the right
of appeal on the ground of acquiescence, "the acts relied upon
must be such as to clearly and unmistakably show acquiescence,
and it must be unconditional, voluntary, and absolute.'' '
(D1~ncan v. Duncan, 175 Cal. 693, 695 [167 P. 141] .) "
[6] And it has been held that an agreement that the acceptance of the benefits of a judgment shall not bar the right of
appeal will be recognized and preserves that right. (See
Succession of Nicholich, (La.App.) 167 So. 831; L1:ghtnrr v.
Board of S1~pervisors, 156 Iowa 398 [136 N.W. 761] ; City of
Seattle v. Liberman, 9 Wash. 276 [37 P. 433] ; see cases contra
169 A.L.R 985, 1058.)
For the foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss the appeal
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, .J., 'fraynor, J., Schauer, ,J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 24415.
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HOYT REED, Appellant, v. CARL 0. NORMAN et al.,
H<'spondents.
[1] Corporations-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.

-A motion to dismiss plaintifC's appeal from an adverse judgment in a stockholder's derivative action could not be sustained
on the ground that plaintiff no longer owned any stock in the
corporation because of an execution sale where his uncontradicted affidavit, filed in opposition to the motion, stated that
the execution purchaser's bid was "for and on account of"
plaintiff, and that any rights or interest in the shares sold at
execution was for plaintiff's lwnellt.
[2] !d.-Stockholders-Suing on Behalf of Corporation.---A motion
to disllliss plainti!T's :tpj.wal 1\mu :lll advt•rtw judgmPnt in n
stutkholdt·r':-; tl••rivativP netiou eould not he snstaiw·d on thP
gTmmd that tl!P!'P was no ,,howing of plnintiff's t·otupliHn<~f'
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 6, 7] Corporations, § 368; [3] Corporations,§ 927; [4] Corporations,§ 353; [5] Corporations,§ 354.

